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INTRODUCTION

One of the primary goals of the patent system is the broad
dissemination of technical knowledge. 1 Patent law forces inventors to
*
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See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Complete
1.
disclosure as a precondition to the issuance of a patent is part of the quid pro quo that justifies
the limited monopoly for the inventor as consideration for full and immediate access by the
public when the limited time expires." (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 175
(1824))).
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disclose how their inventions work. 2 Inventors seeking a patent are
required to describe "the manner and process of making and using"
the patented invention. 3 Additionally, a patent must "enable any
person skilled in the art.., to make and use" the invention. 4 Despite
this explicit statutory disclosure requirement, patent law could do
better at ensuring that patents convey useful information to the
public. 5 Academics have vigorously debated about whether and to
what degree the patent system performs its disclosure function. 6 Many
academics claim that "disclosure" of inventions is less effective than
courts presume, with scientists either not caring about or actively
ignoring patents and the technical information they contain. 7 These
academics argue that the patent document is not a useful source of
information for scientists and innovators.8 Other academics take the
opposite position, arguing that the disclosure mandated by the patent
system leads to valuable dissemination of information.9
This Article argues that both positions, counterintuitively, may
be correct in some cases. Patent law may fail to inform skilled artisans
of the patented invention's technical details to the degree we would
desire, 10 yet still provide valuable nontechnical information to people
who are in a position to invest in the invention.1 1 The patent
document's ability to disclose is not coextensive with its ability to
teach about the invention, a fact often ignored in the academic
literature. This underappreciated insight about patent disclosure
broadens discussion of the disclosure function's role in information
2.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560-62 (2009)
(making the case that the patent document is irrelevant as a means of disclosure).
6.
See id.; Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 139-46
(2006) (arguing that patent law does a poor job of teaching); Jason Rantanen, Peripheral
Disclosure, 74 PITT. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (2012) (defending patent disclosure by pointing out that
'peripheral disclosure" allows patents to disseminate their information in areas other than the
patent document).
7.
Fromer, supra note 5, at 560-62; Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 19, 21-25 (claiming that patents are largely ignored by scientists and innovators).
8.
Fromer, supra note 5, at 560-62; Lemley, supra note 7, at 21-25.
9.
See Lisa L. Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
545, 585 (2012) (finding that "patents can be useful as sources of technical information" in the
nanotechnology industry); Rantanen, supra note 6, at 39-44 (arguing that patents allow
"peripheral disclosure" to occur).
10. Either because the patent document itself is unhelpful for scientists or because the
search costs might be too high for an interested researcher to locate a specific patent.
11. Investment can be through purchasing products from a company, investing in the
company that makes patented products, or some other means.
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transfer: a patent can inform innovators, investors, and consumers
about the value of an inventive idea; a patent can advertise new
technologies to fellow technologists; a patent can promote useful
embodiments of the invention to investors. All of these are examples of
what this Article terms "nontechnical disclosure."
Information divulged by this nontechnical disclosure might
include the patent owner's identity, a company's innovative nature, or
the very existence of patent rights. Nontechnical disclosure does not
meet the statutory requirement for enablement-that a patent inform
a skilled artisan how to make or use the invention. 12 Despite this, it
can be highly useful and valuable to individuals seeking information
about the technology. Essentially, nontechnical disclosure is
information from the patent document about aspects of an invention
13
other than how the invention is made or used.
Including nontechnical disclosure in debates about patent law's
disclosure function can help us better understand the patent system in
two primary ways. First, this form of disclosure provides an additional
explanation for why people seek to patent inventions even though the
value for most inventions is less than the cost of obtaining the patent.
Nontechnical disclosure can be valuable to the implementers or
commercializers of the invention-the same people who may choose
not to read the more formal disclosure in the patent document.
Nontechnical disclosure is also valued by individuals who purchase
the patent rights in the new invention. Consumers are rarely skilled,
in the art of a patent, and therefore some type of disclosure is
necessary to convince them that an invention is worth spending
money on. Further, nontechnical disclosure is valuable to investors or
venture capitalists who are less concerned with how an invention
works than with its market potential, appeal to consumers, or other
nontechnical promise. While a patent may not be worth obtaining
when simply considering the right to exclude gained by patenting, the
decision to seek patent protection makes more sense when one
considers the wider range of audiences for the patent document
(consumers, investors, etc.).
Second, nontechnical disclosure should color our understanding
of the patent system and, more precisely, the patent document's role
in disclosure. Nontechnical disclosure can lend support to the prospect
theory of patents, explaining, at least partially, how follow-on
12.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).

13.

See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259,

265 (2016) (arguing that disclosure facilitates information signaling, which is a form of
nontechnical disclosure).
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innovators discover the patented invention in the first place. Much
has been written about the patent system's teaching function, by
which the patent informs a person of ordinary skill in the art of the
technical workings of the patented invention. 14 But much less has
been written about the nontechnical type of disclosure. 15 Nontechnical
disclosure's relevance to patent theory is best illustrated by focusing
on the commercialization theory 16 and the prospect theory 17 of patent
law. These theories hold that the patent system benefits society by
centralizing an invention in the hands of a small group of people (the
patent owner(s)). Once armed with a patent, the patent owner
coordinates the search for partners that have the ability to
commercialize the invention.1 8 For commercialization theorists,
nontechnical disclosure has special relevance: it helps to explain how
patent owners are able to attract others with whom to collaborate. 19
The recognition of nontechnical disclosure leads to a more robust
understanding of what patent disclosure is and what role it has in
commercializing patented inventions.
But we should also be wary of assigning too much importance
to nontechnical disclosure. There are good reasons to doubt
nontechnical disclosure's value. For instance, marketers may use this
type of disclosure in a manner that attempts to convince customers
that their company is innovative. However, the patents on which this
marketing is based may be invalid or technically useless. Or

14. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
15. See Ted Sichelman, CommercializingPatents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 349 (2010):
Even the prospect theory of patents, which analogizes the innovation process to
mining a rich vein of ore, never quite explains how the vein is initially discovered.
This oversight can be critical, because identifying the specific problem to be solved can
create information that free riders can exploit, potentially diminishing ex ante
incentives to discern areas in need of innovation.
16. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2001) ("The invention must be developed into some commercial
embodiment.").
17. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977). Both the commercialization theory and the prospect theory posit that broad propertylike patents are needed in order to spur innovation. See Sichelman, supra note 15, at 375-76.
18. Kitch, supra note 17, at 277-78 ("[A] patent system lowers the costs for the owner of
technological information of contracting with other firms possessing complementary information
and resources."); Sichelman, supra note 15, at 375-76.
19. See Sichelman, supra note 15, at 364. Many academics separate the commercialization
theory from the prospect theory, and with good reason: the commercialization theory is focused
on bringing inventions into commerce, while the prospect theory is focused on early disclosure of
inventions. For purposes of this Article, however, they will be treated interchangeably because
both theories are interested in achieving the same goal: locating the best intermediary to bring
the patented invention to market.
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commercializers may make boastful claims in their patent in an
attempt to attract the broadest range of partners. In short,
nontechnical disclosure should be looked at warily for the precise
reasons that make it valuable: it is aimed at the person unskilled in
the art, so the information contained in nontechnical disclosure is
often vague, misleading, or cannot be verified. Despite its questionable
value, the existence of nontechnical disclosure tells us something
about why people seek patents.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will describe patent
disclosure as it has been largely understood by judges and academics:
by the requirements found in § 112 of the Patent Act. Part II will
analyze what place disclosure has in the three main theories for the
existence of the patent system: the incentive to invent theory, the
incentive to disclose theory, and the prospect (or commercialization)
theory. It ultimately concludes that all three of these theories fail to
account for nontechnical aspects of disclosure. Part III will introduce
nontechnical disclosure and examine three possible targets of
nontechnical disclosure-consumers, venture capitalists, and follow-on
innovators-in working through nontechnical disclosure in practice.
Part IV then speculates on what nontechnical disclosure theory can
contribute to broader discussions of patent disclosure theory.

I. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF PATENT DISCLOSURE
Courts in the United States have consistently emphasized that
the public is the ultimate beneficiary of the patent system. 20 While the
patentee receives twenty years of exclusive rights to practice the
invention, the public benefits by learning how the patent works. This
is the basic patent quid pro quo: the exclusive right to practice an
invention in exchange for disclosure of the invention. 21 Without the
patent system to protect an invention, an inventor is likely to keep the

20. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (stating that the patent
system should be thought of as "a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive
monopoly for a limited period of time"); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 150-51 (1989); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) ("In
consideration of [an invention's] disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the
patent is granted.").
21. Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictabilityin the On-Sale
Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 937 (2000).
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invention as a trade secret, or worse, not invent at all. 22 Information
about inventions would likely remain hidden from the public or never
be discovered in the first place. Either way, innovation would be
slowed. 23 But with the patent system (and the disclosure that such a
system mandates), the public is able to enjoy the new technical
knowledge as soon as the patent is published, although they may not
practice the invention until the twenty-year patent term expires.
The legal requirements for what a patent must disclose are
found in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 24 There are three main, somewhat
25
overlapping, disclosure requirements under the current U.S. regime:
enablement, written description, and best mode. 26 Specifically, the
patent act describes the following requirements:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
27
the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.

The primary way that a patent discloses information is found
in the enablement requirement established in §112.28 The former
Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, Judge Rader, has stated that
enablement is "arguably the most important patent doctrine after
obviousness. ''29 Enablement requires that a patent teach a person
skilled in the relevant art how to make and use the invention. 30 It
ensures that once the patent term expires, others will be able to
22. Vicenzo Denicolo & Luigi A. Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents,23 INT'L REV, L.
& ECON. 365, 365-66 (2004); see Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation?
Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs,95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005) (demonstrating
that countries with patent laws generated more and more varied innovations than those that
lacked a patent system).
23. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 26869 (2007); Fromer, supra note 5, at 548 ("Disclosure of information about inventions stimulates
productivity .. .[by] permit[ting] society at large to apply the information by freely making or
using the patented invention after the expiration of the patent.").
24. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 127.
25. Prior to the creation of the U.S. patent system, the U.K. had a more voluntary system
of disclosure. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1289-91 (2001).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
27. Id.
28. Jason Rantanen, Patent Law's Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 370
n.2 (2014) (noting that disclosure is a "meta-principle" that is the overarching goal enacted by
the more formal doctrinal incantations of § 112).
29. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
30.
Holbrook, supra note 6, at 128.
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practice the invention. 31 The Federal Circuit has determined that a
patent needs to teach the basic functioning of the invention, although
that functioning may require a bit of experimenting from a person of
ordinary skill. 32 Enablement allows for some experimentation to occur,
but once that experimentation becomes "undue" the patent has not
sufficiently disclosed the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112. 33 The
enablement requirement, therefore, is conceptually simple; the
inventor must teach how to make and use the invention to someone
skilled in the art of the patent. 34 But in practice making such
a
judgments is fact-intensive and fraught with difficulty. 35 Whether
36
disclosure is enabling is one of the thorniest areas of patent law.
The written description requirement further complicates
things. For years this doctrine was used largely to police applicants
who added "new matter" to an already filed application by amending
their claims (which is permissible) 37 in ways that had no written
description in the specification (which is impermissible). 38 But the
Federal Circuit has expanded the role of the written description
requirement, applying it to originally filed claims as well as afterarising amendments. 39 The result has been a further hurdle to

31. Id.
32. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
33. Id.; see also Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REV. 127, 147-50 (2009) (explaining the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence regarding what
constitutes "undue experimentation").
34. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 129 ("Enablement, while conceptually simple, is legally and
factually complex.").
35. Id.
36. Some commentators note that the fact-intensive and therefore high cost of mounting an
enablement or written description challenge may explain the general reluctance of accused
infringers to make such challenges. John R. Allison & Lisa L. Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate
Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 645 (2016) ("This may... reflect a
reluctance to bring weaker enablement and written-description challenges, perhaps due to
greater costs in raising these defenses.").
37. For more on how patentees can use (and abuse) the PTO's system of amendments, see
Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 531-39 (2010).
38. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that the
parent application "must reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed
the later-claimed subject matter at the time the parent application was filed" in order to meet
the written description requirement); Holbrook, supra note 6, at 127-28.
39. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The
Federal Circuit has a long history of engaging with other branches of government and being
spurred to action by threatened legislative action; Ariad was likely such a case. See J. Jonas
Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1050-55 (2014) (theorizing that Congress, the
Supreme Court, and the Federal Circuit have a form of dialogue that is unique); J. Jonas
Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961,
962-68 (cataloging the Federal Circuit's reactions to proposed legislative patent reform); see also
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patentability for certain technologies. Patents for technologies in
which the function of the invention is sometimes apparent before the
details of how the invention works (like biotechnology) are more
susceptible to written description challenges. It is for this reason that
many commentators argue that only certain technologies, like
biotechnology, are impacted by the written description requirement. 40
The last requirement, best mode, requires the patentee to
subjectively disclose what he or she believes is the best method of
practicing the invention, if there is one. 4 1 Its objective is to force the
inventor to disclose the best method of practicing the invention known
to the inventor, rather than keeping that method a secret. In this way,
the best mode requirement seeks to avoid patentees disclosing inferior
methods of practicing an invention while keeping the superior
methods secret. 42 However, with the America Invents Act of 2011, best
mode is no longer a means of invalidating a patent once it has
issued. 43 This change in the law effectively took the bite out of best
mode as a patentability standard. 44
Thus, the three requirements of § 112-enablement, written
description, and best mode-are the doctrinal elements behind
disclosure. 45 Judicial opinions often cite to the three-part disclosure
requirements of § 112 as the quid pro quo of patent law: in exchange
for a patent an inventor discloses how to make and use his invention
and the best method for carrying it out. 46 Almost all scholarly
discussion on patent disclosure focuses on these three principles. 47

J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REV. 401, 432-35 (2016) (describing the
federal circuit's lobbying efforts).
40. Janice Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 636-46 (1998). But see Michael Risch,
A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 144 (2010)
("This does not mean that written description need be 'super-enablement.' ").
41. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
42. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 130.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2012) ("[F]ailure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis
on which any claim of a patent may be cancelled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.").
44. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-11 (2012) (describing the debates about the best mode requirement in
Congress).
45. Rantanen, supra note 28, at 372.
46. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 5, at 546-47; Holbrook, supra note 6; Sean B.
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 628-29 (2010)
[hereinafter Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents]; Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53
WM & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2089-92 (2012). The requirement that patent claims be definite also
monitors how much a patent discloses about the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2012).

2016]

NONTECHNICAL DISCLOSURE

1581

II. DISCLOSURE'S ROLE IN PATENT LAW'S DOMINANT EXPLANATORY
THEORIES

Academic theories about patent disclosure center on § 112.48
Most commentators feel that § 112 fails to achieve the goals of
disclosure, such as disseminating scientific information, teaching
other technologists how to perform the invention, and advancing
scientific knowledge. 49 Others believe that § 112 is useful, resulting in
50
a patent system that conveys useful information to other innovators.
Regardless of one's position on patent disclosure's effectiveness, the
academic debate has been centered on how much technical
information about the patented invention gets delivered to the
51
public.
Yet a more fundamental question about patent disclosure
exists: Why do we have it in the first place? Academics and courts
differ on why we have patent disclosure.5 2 Some think it is to further
scientific and technological knowledge. 53 Some feel that it is to place
boundaries on the invention. 54 Some feel that it is to establish prior

Definiteness, however, is typically not considered part of patent "disclosure," and for that reason
I will focus more on 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
48. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 17, at 265-90.
49. See Fromer, supra note 5, at 563-94 (describing the "systematic inadequacies" of patent
disclosure); Holbrook, supra note 6, at 146 ("[T]he courts have grossly overstated the true extent'
of [the teaching] function."); Ben Roin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2026-27 (2005) ("If the Supreme Court is correct that 'the
ultimate goal' of the patent system is to facilitate the disclosure of information that would
otherwise be kept secret, then our patent system appears to be in trouble."); Seymore, The
Teaching Function of Patents, supra note 47, at 641 (suggesting changes to bring patent doctrine
more in line with the goals of patent law).
50. See Ouellette, supra note 9, at 585 (finding that "patents can be useful as sources of
technical information" in the nanotechnology industry).
51. See Fromer, supra note 5, at 550 (explaining that disclosure can be useful to
technologists by teaching or inspiring them); Rantanen, supra note 6, at 44-45 (arguing that
§ 112 gives inventors the freedom to use their invention in a number of ways).
52. Compare this basic dispute about the role of disclosure with academics' disputes about
the fundamental role of patent-eligible subject matter doctrine. See J. Jonas Anderson, Applying
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 279-86 (2015)
(listing academic theories about patentable subject matter).
53. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1012 (2008) (arguing that patents help to codify scientific knowledge); Mark D.
Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the 'Written Description' Requirement (and
Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 55 (2000) ("Patent systems
aspire to stimulate technological progress by eliciting disclosure.").
54. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 2 (2012) (using a teaching example that demonstrates the confluence of the disclosure
requirements with patent claiming).
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art. 55 This Part will briefly address how disclosure impacts the three
main patent theories: the incentive to invent theory, the incentive to
disclose theory, and the prospect or commercialization theory. By
evaluating disclosure's role in the theories used to explain the
existence of the patent system, one can better understand the role of
nontechnical disclosure.
A. Incentive to Invent
A majority of patent scholars believe that the patent system's
ability to incentivize invention is the primary benefit that the public
derives from the patent system.5 6 The incentive to invent theory rests
on the idea that inventors will develop more inventions with the
promise of a patent than they would absent such protection. 57
Although scholars differ greatly on whether they think patents are
necessary to induce invention, 58 and the cost of inducing such
inventions, 59 there is general agreement that patents do provide an
incentive to inventors, and thus encourage the invention of new
60
technologies.
So what is disclosure's role in the incentive to invent theory?
Under the incentive to invent rationale, disclosure is more of a
positive side effect than a goal. 61 If the patent system induces someone

55. See Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2175, 2175-76 (2000) (arguing for disclosure as a strategy for establishing the prior art).
56. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Reciprocity: The Temporary Presence
Exception and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008)
("The patent system, particularly the exclusive right to practice an invention, is designed to
encourage inventors to create, patent, and commercialize new inventions."); Roberto Mazzoleni &
Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. OF ECON.
ISSUES, 1031, 1033-35 (1998) (discussing the four broad theories about the purpose of patents
and calling the invention theory "unquestionably... the most familiar one"); Sichelman, supra
note 15, at 344 ("[P]atent law is primarily designed to induce invention.").
57. Sichelman, supra note 15, at 344.
58. Cf. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY passim
(2008) (finding that patents are "an unnecessary evil" in incentivizing invention); Letter from
Fifty-One Law Professors to Senators Grassley and Leahy and Congressmen Goodlatte and
Conyers (Mar. 10, 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Economists-Law-ProfsLetter-re-Patent-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W3W-B5M9] (stating that Congress should tread
carefully when reforming patent laws as the U.S patent system is "the engine of innovation" in
the country).
59. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 91778 (2011).
60. Id.
61. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 401, 401-46 (2010).
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to invent, then the patent has largely achieved its purpose. 62 For
incentive to invent theorists, disclosure is peripheral to the goals of
the patent system and is not the primary function. Only when
on occasion, per the
disclosure leads to further innovation (and it6 does
3
disclosure.
about
care
we
do
incentive theory)
Katherine Strandburg has recognized the tension between the
incentive to invent theory of patent law and the doctrine of
disclosure. 64 She has noted that disclosure only plays a role in the
incentive to invent theory when two conditions are met: first, the
invention must not be self-disclosing-that is, it cannot be reverse
engineered-and second, there are alternative incentives to invent
besides the patent system (i.e., trade secrecy).6 5 It is these inventions
(non-self-disclosing inventions that can be kept secret) in which
disclosure requires justification from incentive to invent theorists, for
it is these inventions which would have been incentivized without a
patent system.
The first condition (non-self-disclosing invention) is a necessary
condition for an invention to implicate disclosure's value to incentive
to invent theorists because with self-disclosing inventions, the public
enjoys the knowledge of how to make and use the invention even
absent the formal patent requirements. Simply placing self-disclosing
inventions in the marketplace makes apparent how to create them.
Therefore, the disclosure requirements are irrelevant when the
invention itself reveals its operation-we would have the information
with or without the patent. No additional disclosure requirements are
needed for self-disclosing inventions.
The second condition (that the invention could have been
incentivized absent the patent system) is a necessary condition to
implicate disclosure's value to incentive to invent theorists because
such inventions need some alternative justification for why society
grants a patent on them: If the invention would have come about
anyway, why does society need to give it twenty years of exclusivity?
The answer to that question by the courts has typically been

62. See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 132-34 ("The disclosure requirements, and particularly
enablement, therefore run counter to the incentive theory of patent law.").
See Fromer, supra note 5, at 550 ("The disclosed information can be useful for other
63.
").
technologists ....
64. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain,2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 110-11; see also Holbrook, supranote 6, at 133.
65. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 133-34.
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"disclosure."6 6 In these cases (non-self-disclosing invention in which
trade secrecy provides an alternate way to profit from the invention),
some incentive to invent theorists have been somewhat skeptical of
67
patent disclosure's value.
What is striking about all of this is how limited the situations
are in which incentive to disclose theory has anything at all to say
about disclosure. Given the limited situations in which disclosure
impacts the incentive to invent theory, it should come as no surprise
that disclosure has been downplayed by incentive to invent theorists. 68
It is largely from incentive to invent theorists that we hear many of
the criticisms of the current patent system's lack of disclosure. They
criticize the disclosure function of the patent system as being too weak
to be useful as a means of disseminating information. 69 Further, they
criticize the overplayed role that courts assign to disclosure in light of
the evidence that scientists rarely look at patents.7 0 This, they say, is
evidence that the patent system should really be about trying to
encourage people to invent rather than mandating disclosure. If
anything, patent disclosure dampens the incentives to innovate.7 1 The
academic literature has treated patent disclosure as something that is
a cost to patent owners. Disclosure can, on the margins, lead to followon innovations, but many scholars doubt that disclosure generally has
72
this effect.
Generally, the incentive to invent theory tends to downplay the
impact of patent law's teaching function. To incentive to invent
theorists, patents don't tend to teach very well, thus the role of patent
disclosure is minimal. But this view mistakenly equates the teaching
function with disclosure. Disclosure can be much larger than the
teaching function, as I will demonstrate in Part III. For now, it is
66. I have disagreed with Professor Strandburg on what we should do with nondisclosing
inventions of this sort. See Anderson, supra note 59, at 955-56. The crux of our debate centers
around the teaching value of disclosure (Professor Strandburg thinks we get a lot from it; I'm
generally doubtful). See also Holbrook, supra note 6, at 134 n.56 ("Professor Strandburg's
response would be that social welfare may yet be enhanced if the patent system encouraged
disclosure of the invention so as to facilitate greater innovation ....
").
67. See Anderson, supra note 59, at 940-45 (summarizing academic critiques of the value
of patent disclosure).
68. Id.
69. See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 139.
70. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he courts have grossly overstated the teaching function of patent
disclosures.").
71. See Devlin, supra note 61, at 419 (claiming that the disclosure doctrines "create a
disincentive" to patent protection).
72.
Holbrook, supra note 6, at 134 n.56 ("The value of such disclosure [to teach other
innovators], however, appears to be minimal.").
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sufficient merely to recognize the distinction between the teaching
function and disclosure more broadly. An individual patent's
disclosure might be limited to the patent's ability to teach, but it need
not be so limited in every case. Disclosure can encompass a range of
functions (teaching, informing, marketing, signaling, etc.), all of which
may or may not be useful to a given patentee. The teaching function is
the statutorily mandated element of the disclosure function, but
patents can (and do) disclose nontechnical information as well.
B. Incentive to Disclose
The incentive to disclose theory-also known as the patent
73
quid pro quo-assumes a well-functioning patent disclosure system.
According to disclosure theorists (not to mention judges who have
heavily relied on the disclosure rationale), the patent system is
designed to bring inventions out into public view. 74 Without the patent
system, inventors would have to resort to alternate means of
monetizing their inventions, and many would rely on trade secrecy,
depriving the public of the knowledge of how inventions are produced
and function. 75 In exchange for a patent, the inventor must disclose
how the invention is practiced, thereby forming the quid pro quo of the
patent system-the inventor discloses his invention in exchange for a
twenty-year exclusivity period in which no one else can practice the
76
invention.
Disclosure theorists are among the strongest defenders of the
patent disclosure system. They have confronted evidence of disinterest
in patents by scientists with evidence that in particular industries the
opposite is true. Biotech and nanotechnology are among the industries
where the disclosure function of the patent system appears to operate
well. 77 Therefore, according to disclosure theorists, the patent system
can be justified by how much information it brings to the public that
otherwise would be private. In this way disclosure theorists differ
from incentive to invent scholars, who view patent law as primarily
concerned with encouraging innovation. Disclosure theorists put the
73. Kitch, supra note 17, at 287 ("The reward theory has tended to emphasize the
disclosure role of the patent.").
74. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of a patent system... serves to add to the body of
published scientific/technologic knowledge.").
75. See Anderson, supra note 59, at 919.
76.

See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and

Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV 1017, 1022 (1989).
See Ouellette, supra note 9, at 585.
77.
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primary emphasis on disclosing new inventions and the further
innovation that comes from that disclosure.
But disclosure theorists run into trouble in attempting to
explain the patent system as a large system of information transfer
and nothing more. That is why there are very few "pure" disclosure
theorists. A pure disclosure theorist must account for the fact that
patent disclosure is essentially ignored by major industries, like the
computer and electronics industries. 78 If disclosure is society's
payment for granting a patent, it appears that society is getting the
raw end of the bargain, at least in those industries that ignore
patents. The lack of patent disclosure is blamed on various things,
including the thick verbiage of the patent document itself,79 the
unusable amount of information disclosed in the patent system, 8 0 and
an unclear boundary scope for patents in general.8 1 Others argue that
the patent system succeeds at the disclosure of new inventions,
pointing out that scientists do read patents (at least in certain
industries) and that patents give parties the freedom to negotiate
freely knowing that the invention is protected, leading to greater
disclosure.
Disclosure theorists argue that patents teach future
innovators. This is the foundation of the disclosure theory. Yet few
disclosure theorists recognize the fact that patents may perform
disclosure apart from their role in teaching how the patent operates.
In this, disclosure theorists and incentive to invent theorists are
similar. Both groups tend to emphasize disclosure's teaching function,
while virtually ignoring the fact that patents have a nontechnical
disclosure function.

78. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 22 n.18. Both the computer and electronics industry have
a reputation for avoiding patents. This is for many reasons: they have (or had in the past) reason
to fear being hit with treble damages if they knew that a patent existed that they were later
found to infringe; there are so many patents in the industry that it is impossible to keep up; the
patents in these industries do not tend to coalesce around key terms-it is difficult to know what
to look for; patent claims on these areas are vague, written in a style inaccessible to
technologists, or written in functional language that makes deciphering what these inventions
cover very difficult, if not impossible, to discover before trial.
79.
See Fromer, supra note 5, at 543.
80. Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office:
Reframing the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 90, 95 (2011).
81.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 9 (2008).
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C. Prospect Theory /Commercialization Theory
A third theory for why we have a patent system posits that the
main benefit of a patent system is the centralization that occurs when
granting property-like rights in information.8 2 Unlike the other two
main theories of the patent system, the prospect theory supposes that
a patent will attract those interested in collaborating on, investing in,
or commercializing the invention. These partners will know that
without the patent holder's consent they cannot make or
commercialize the product.8 3 First proposed by Edward Kitch, the
prospect theory likens the patent system to the early American system
of granting mining rights in western land.8 4 The most productive users
(be they researchers, marketers, producers, etc.) have an incentive to
obtain or acquire a patent.85 Thus, the patent system is a means of
centralizing rights in the invention and then coordinating
86
development.
Prospect theory has an unstable position with patent
disclosure. Many advocates believe that disclosure plays a minor role
in prospect theory.8 7 Kitch himself had a dim view of disclosure's role
in the patent system. Kitch felt that patent disclosure was not
concerned with teaching the technology to others, but rather was
concerned about defining legal rights in technology.8 8 Patent
disclosure, to Kitch, served the public only in defining the invention
and announcing to the world what was and was not within the
invention's ambit. Similar to modern claim construction, Kitch felt
that disclosure was best viewed as a means of precisely stating what
property was owned by the patentee.8 9 Inventors, according to Kitch,

82. See generally John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 441 (2004); Kitch supra note 17.
83. See Duffy, supra note 82, at 441 (stating that the prospect theory is the search for
coordination of research).
84.
See Kitch, supra note 17, at 271-75.
See id.
85.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 287-88.
88. Id. at 287 ("The purpose of the description in the patent is not to disclose the
commercially relevant technology, but to provide a context in which legal limits of the claim
acquire meaning.").
89. For more on claim construction as a means of defining claim scope, see J. Jonas
Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2014); J. Jonas Anderson & Peter
S. Menell, Empirical Studies of Claim Construction, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David
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would be sufficiently incentivized to spread information about their
inventions to the people who were the most interested in
collaborating. This, Kitch thought, was best done "directly," without
reliance on the patent document itself.90 Thus, according to Kitch,
there is little to be gained from patent disclosure other than defining
the invention.
John Duffy, on the other hand, has proposed that one of the
most beneficial aspects of the prospect theory is disclosure, or more
precisely, the early disclosure of inventions.9 1 In Duffy's view, the
prospect theory views the patent system as the carrot that entices
inventors to patent early, and thus disclose their inventions as soon as
possible. 92 This in turn facilitates traditional
prospecting
(collaboration), but it also brings inventions to light at the earliest
possible time, thereby furthering knowledge and innovation.9 3 Yet the
key to Duffy's insight was that the early grant of patent rights often
led to patent races with a winner-take-all patent; it was just this sort
of technological competition that could constrain patent monopolies,
because early grant also meant early expiration of the rights obtained
in the patent.9 4 To Duffy, disclosure has a big role to play in managing
such patent races. 95 Thus, to Duffy, the prospect theory relies on
96
disclosure for its explanatory power.
Others have critiqued prospect theory for not explicitly
explaining how commercialization proceeds. Ted Sichelman has said,
"[T]he prospect theory of patents, which analogizes the innovation
process to mining a rich vein of ore, never quite explains how the vein
is initially discovered." 97 For him, prospect theory has done a poor job
of describing how patentees and producers, investors, and innovators
become aware of one another. Similarly, Robert Merges and Richard

L. Schwartz eds., forthcoming 2017) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2661005) [https://perma.cc/TNX4-SKEV].
90. Kitch, supra note 17, at 287.
91. Duffy, supra note 82.
92. Id. at 493-96 (analogizing patent races to Demsetzian auctions).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 510.
95. See id. at 497-99 ('Moreover, even if a firm could investigate technological prospects in
secrecy, disclosure may be in the firm's best interest in the early stages of research ... .
96. Id.
97. Sichelman, supra note 15, at 349.
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Nelson have questioned how prospectors inform others of their
98
inventions.
Prospect theorists generally take a dim view of information
disclosed in the patent, with notable exceptions like John Duffy. This
aspect of prospect theory-the downplaying of disclosure-has been
cited by scholars as a flaw with the theory.9 9 Prospect theory views
patent disclosure as only adding value in its ability to delineate legal
rights-specifically, to define the scope of the patent. 10 0 Delineating
rights is undoubtedly of great value; trade secrecy, for example,
suffers from the failure to properly delineate rights, lowering the
value of trade secrets generally. 10 1 But if rights delineation is the endall-be-all of patent disclosure, disclosure is less about teaching followon innovators and more about creating legal entitlements. This is fine,
although that is not the typical way that courts talk about patent
disclosure. 10 2 Thus, the prospect theory (like the incentive to invent
theory) discounts much of the teaching function of the patent
system. 103 Kitch's prospect theory relies on the inventors' own efforts
(and not the patent document itself) to find partners for
commercialization. 104

98. Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 873 (1990) ("But with the technological 'prospects'... no one knows for sure
what possible inventions are in the technological pool.").
99. See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual
Innovation: A New Basis for PatentRewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 63 (2005).
100. Kitch, supra note 17, at 287-88.
101. See James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1181,
1182 (1997) (stating that defining a trade secret is one of the main problems with trade secret
law).
102. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the
general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general
store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal that the Federal
Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual
development of further significant advances in the art.
103. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 17, at 287-88 (stating that the purpose of patent disclosure
is not "to disclose the commercially relevant technology, but to provide" legal limits to the scope
of the rights).
104. See id.
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III. NONTECHNICAL DISCLOSURE
A. Towards a Broader Theory of Patent Disclosure
Despite what the previous two Parts may have led you to
believe, patent disclosure is not monolithic. There are various ways in
which the patent system can disclose information. 10 5 In addition to
telling the reader how to make and use the invention, patents can
contain other useful information that does not seek to "teach" the
invention. Academics have devoted a lot of attention to the teaching
function of disclosure. 10 6 They have written about whether disclosure
achieves its teaching goals,1 0 7 whether disclosure is the ultimate goal
of the patent system,10 8 whether § 112 is sufficient to achieve the
teaching ambitions of the patent system, 109 how disclosure factors into
litigated cases,11 0 and a host of other questions.
Much less academic attention has been paid to the
nontechnical aspects of patent disclosure. Nontechnical disclosure is
the ability of a patent to disclose information that is not related to the
traditional disclosure goal of teaching. Nontechnical disclosure
informs the reader of something nontechnical about the invention.
Often (though not always), nontechnical disclosure is directed at the
non-artisan: someone unfamiliar with the technology behind the
patent. In certain instances, nontechnical disclosure can lead to
opportunities for collaboration.
Disclosure has always been focused around the PHOSITA: the
person having ordinary skill in the art.1 11 This makes sense, as
technical knowledge of a patent's operation is valuable only to
someone with skill and knowledge in the art. 112 Therefore, patent
105. See Rantanen, supra note 6, at 44-45 (demonstrating that the patent system permits
inventors to teach through means other than their patent, including scientific publications and
product marketing).
106. See supra notes 5-6; see also Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, supra note
47, at 641-43.
107. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 5, at 544 (making "the case that the patent document is
effectively irrelevant in practice for informing scientific and technological research").
108. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2081, 2093 (2000).
109. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 40-41 (1991).
110. See Allison & Ouellette, supra note 36.
111. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over
Fact-Findingin the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 907 (2004).
112. Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 886; Rai, supra note 111.
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doctrine requires that an inventor describe in sufficient detail that one
skilled in the art can practice the invention without undue
experimentation. 113 However, there are numerous nonskilled
audiences that a patent can reach. The dissemination of important
information to a consumer may not allow the consumer to make the
invention himself, but that is beside the point. The consumer may
need to know other information before deciding to purchase a patented
device: How much does the patented product cost? Does it work? Is it
better than what came before? Is it technologically innovative? Very
little of the information needed to make a purchasing decision will be
contained in a patent. But the patent (even the very existence of the
patent) may encourage a consumer to purchase, even though that
information is not technical in nature. Ultimately, for someone
attempting to profit from an invention, the purchasing decision is of
supreme importance.
Nontechnical disclosure conveys information about the patent
itself, not the invention's technical specifications. Indeed, nontechnical
disclosure is more about the existence of a patent than what the
patented invention covers. For example, a venture capitalist may not
initially know all of the science behind a portfolio of biotech patents
that his company is considering investing in, but the existence of a
patent may enable him to more accurately estimate the company's
value. 114 Indeed, numerous economic studies of patents held by startup companies reach similar conclusions: patents can signal invention
115
quality and value to investors, regardless of the technical details.
There are other scholars who have written about ideas similar
to nontechnical disclosure. Jason Rantanen has written about
alternative types of disclosure. 116 He focuses on disclosure of
information that would not have occurred absent a patent. 11 7 He gives
several examples, such as scientific publications, marketing materials,
and self-disclosing inventions, in which this "peripheral disclosure"

113. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
114. Of course, no venture capitalist worth her salt would just count the number of patents
in deciding whether to invest. Investment decisions are usually made after thoughtful evaluation
of the company's assets. However, patents are public documents that can allow investors a quick
and dirty substitute for innovation activity.
115. Annamaria Conti et al., Patents as Signals for Startup Financing,61 J. INDUS. ECON.
592 (2013) (conducting an empirical study on Israeli companies between 1994-2011); Annamaria
Conti et al., Show Me the Right Stuff: Signals for High-Tech Startups, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 341 (2013).
116. See Rantanen, supranote 6.
117. Id. at 16.
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occurs. 118 The theory of peripheral disclosure is attractive and one
with which I largely agree. Rantanen is dealing with a form of
disclosure that differs from nontechnical disclosure, however.
Peripheral disclosure is "information that an inventor could not share
with the public without losing the ability to monetize the invention." 119
This is technical disclosure that emanates from somewhere other than
the patent. 120 What this Article is concerned with, on the other hand,
is nontechnical disclosure that emanates from the patent itself.
Similarly, Clarisa Long has theorized about patents as signals.
She views disclosure as a proxy for harder-to-quantify qualities such
as the innovative nature of a firm, rather than as a teacher of
scientists and engineers. 121 Her "patents as signals" theory has many
similarities with nontechnical disclosure: both are more concerned
with the signaling function of a patent and less concerned than most
academic treatments about the technical details in the patent; both
theories hold that there is a substantial benefit to such information
and that patenting is the only way to get such information. Yet her
theory is focused on the non-teaching value owners place in patents,
not disclosure per se. 122 Long is more concerned with how patents are
valued and is less concerned with theories of how and why disclosure
occurs. Signaling theory is in agreement with technical nondisclosure,
but they have a different focus. 123 Signaling theory is focused on
patent valuation while nontechnical disclosure is concerned with
disclosure. But Long's signaling theory is a valuable insight that is
discussed more fully in Part IV.
B. Examples of NontechnicalDisclosure
Nontechnical disclosure has less relevance than traditional
disclosure for scientists or others looking to understand how an
invention operates. However, information about the patent (aside from
the technical specifications) can be valuable to certain kinds of

118. Id. at 21-30.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Cf. Fromer, supra note 5, at 544 ("In theory, disclosure can occur in many different
ways, but in reality,... the patent document is the primary situs of technical information about
a patented invention.").
121. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
122. Id. at 627 ("I challenge the traditional assumption that exclusivity is the alpha and
omega of the private value of patent rights.").
123. See Asay, supra note 13, at 265.
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audiences. 124 Those audiences, in turn, might find certain nontechnical
information useful. This Section highlights three of those types of
nontechnical information-marketing information, the nature of the
firm/inventor, and the owner of the patent-in an attempt to illustrate
how nontechnical disclosure operates. This is hardly a comprehensive
list; rather, these examples demonstrate how the patent system
discloses information that is not necessarily technical information. It
will also show that the audience for such information is much broader
than the typical PHOSITA audience, although the reliability of such
disclosure is questionable.
1. Marketing Information
Disclosure is designed for people that are skilled in the
technology of the patent. 125 For example, a patent on the touch screen
functions of a phone would likely be written with an eye towards
informing an electrical engineer or computer scientist about how the
touch screen works. Conversely, the typical consumer of a phone
covered by that patent is unlikely to understand how the phone
operates, the electronic connections that power the phone, or the
software code that underlies the phone's functionality. Traditional
disclosure doctrine is unconcerned with the consumer. As long as the
PHOSITA can make or use the invention without undue
experimentation, the patent is enabled.126
Despite being ignored by disclosure doctrine, consumers can
from patents. The most basic type of information
information
glean
that can be conveyed by a patent is that a patent has, in fact, been
issued. This can be useful for consumers deciding whether to purchase
a particular product. Consumers of patented products are rarely
PHOSITAs. But companies care greatly about these non-PHOSITAs.
Companies use their patents as a type of advertising, extolling the
virtues of a product or company. 127 This form of disclosure is targeted
to a nontechnical audience and conveys primarily nontechnical
124. For more about the various audiences to which patents may be directed, see Timothy R.
Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, PatentLaw's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72 (2012).
125. See Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law's PHOSITA
Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 236 (2009) (noting that § 112 is directed at persons skilled
in the art of a particular patent).
126. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
127. Ann Bartow, SeparatingMarketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposalfor a
New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 1, 2 (2000) (noting that patents can be used for advertising, enhancing the image of the
company, and adding fiber to a patent portfolio).
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information about the patent. This nontechnical disclosure serves as a
proxy for other, more difficult to quantify, aspects of a product. 128
Advertisers may appeal to the innovative nature of a product. 129 Or
alternatively, they may appeal to the fine craftsmanship or durability
of a product.1 30 Or they might emphasize the "sexiness" of a product or
131
brand and the prestige of owning such a product.
Obtaining (and advertising) one's patent informs the world that
what one has done is innovative/well-made/sexy. Using the fact that a
product is patented in advertisements draws on the public's esteem for
patenting and attempts to leverage that esteem towards the product
being advertised. This is "disclosure" without disclosing any
information about the technology at issue.
132
Consider this 2013 Mercedes Benz commercial:
Man's voice: "To hold a patent that would change the modern world would define you as
an innovator. To hold more than one patent of this caliber would define you as a true
leader. To hold more than eighty thousand? Well, that would make you the creators of
the 2013 Mercedes Benz E Class. Quite possibly the most advanced luxury sedan ever."

The commercial is touting the car's craftsmanship and
innovative qualities by appealing to the public's admiration of the task
of acquiring patents. Nothing in this advertisement hints at what the
patents cover (and with good reason; at least some of the eighty
thousand patents are undoubtedly of questionable validity), but that's
not the point. The patent system discloses something about the brand
to nontechnical audiences, whether it's the innovation or technological
ambition of the E-Class, or the distinction of having a car packed with
133
so many (alleged) innovations.
Another way this nontechnical disclosure occurs is in the
marking of patented products. All patented products should be
marked in order to alert the public that the product is covered by a
patent.1 34 Products covered by patents that have not yet issued are
often marked with a "patent pending" label. However, there is no legal

128. See id. at 2-3.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.

132. CommLiveFun, 2013 Mercedes Benz E 350 TV Commercial, Patents,YoUTUBE (Dec. 11
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYxmQShZ2Hw [https://perma.cc/2U4K-TNWS].
133. Id.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). Failure to properly mark a product does not entirely preclude a
finding of infringement of the patent, but it does foreclose damages during the period in which
the patent was not marked. See, e.g., Philips Elecs. N.A. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d
639 (D. Del. 2004) (limiting damages to the period in which the patented product was marked).
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justification for such a mark; no rights are acquired by including the
135
label nor are rights forfeited through the absence of such a label.
Such products with patent pending labels could be the result of
ignorance of the law; after all, thousands of YouTube videos expressly
state that the video is used without knowledge of anyone owning the
1 36
copyright, even though ignorance is not a defense to such copying.
But more than likely the patent pending label may be used in the
same way as a patent in the Mercedes advertisement example. Simply
knowing that someone has applied for a patent has the potential to
reassure consumers that they are purchasing something innovative.
The existence of a patent has usually been taken for granted by
scholars. Few studies exist on the impact that advertising of a patent
might have on consumers. 137 But this is a form of nontechnical
disclosure: the patent discloses something unrelated to the technical
function of the invention (in this case, the existence of the patent
itself) to an interested audience (consumers).
Inevitably, this nontechnical disclosure may be used for less
than benevolent uses. As the Mercedes Benz advertisement above
demonstrates, nontechnical disclosure, because it is pitched at a
nonexpert audience, may be used to try to deceive the public. If
anyone is buying a Mercedes Benz E-Class for the eighty thousand
innovations it contains, they will be sorely disappointed to learn that a
large number of those patents are rather pedestrian innovations.
Nontechnical disclosure's value stems from a much wider audience of
consumers, as opposed to the much narrower class for traditional
disclosure: PHOSITAs. But this also presents a challenge for
disclosure theorists; the nontechnical audience has a much harder
time verifying claims of quality.

135. The PTO website states that the term "Patent Pending" has "no legal effect, but only
give[s] information that an application for patent has been filed in the USPTO." U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, General Information ConcerningPatents: Patent Marking and Patent Pending
2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning(Oct.
patents#heading-29 [https://perma.cc/Q23K-MFRK]. It is prohibited to place a "patent pending"
label when no application has been filed. See id. ("False use of ['Patent Pending'] ... is
prohibited.); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Provisional Application for Patent,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/provisional
-application-patent [https://perma.cc/78WE-JBUT] (stating that filing an application "allows the
term 'Patent Pending'" to be used).
136. Kurt Hunt, Note, Copyright and YouTube: Pirate'sPlayground or Fair Use Forum?, 14
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.197, 198 (2007) (estimating that as much as seventy percent
of YouTube's content is a violation of copyright law).
137. For one of the few treatments, consider Bartow, supra note 127.
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2. The Innovative Nature of a Company
Investors are the second group of nonexperts who may glean
important, nontechnical information from a patent. When deciding
whether to invest in a company, venture capitalists often rely on the
company's patent portfolio to assess the innovative output of the
company. 138 Aside from sending signals about the company's general
culture of innovation, patents tell an investor that the company has a
means of monetizing its innovations and preventing copying of those
inventions. Thus, patents can be valuable to investors who look to
them not for technical information about a company's inventions, but
for nontechnical disclosure concerning how innovative a company may
be. 139
One of the well-documented examples of patents being used to
convey this nontechnical information is in venture capital. Venture
capitalists make bids on companies that are tied to the creative output
of their inventors. Studies have shown that the patents a company
obtains may influence the price that venture capitalists offer for a
company. 140 Venture capitalists make decisions on a company's worth
based (in part) on the patents they acquire. 141 Obviously, venture
capitalists care deeply about what a patent discloses and (most
importantly) protects. 142 If they don't understand the technology
themselves, they will usually have the patents outsourced to a third
party who can advise them on the technology. But venture capitalists
also rely on patents to tell them something about the firm that is
separate from what technology the firm has developed or acquired.
Clarisa Long has explored this type of disclosure. 143 In her
article, Patent Signals, she moved beyond the two-dimensional
framework of patents as rights and rents.14 4 She envisioned patents as
a "means of credibly publicizing information"-information that was
138. David Hsu & Rosemary H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial
Ventures, DRUID SUMMER CONFERENCE 2007 (May 2007), https://www.researchgate.net/profile
/RosemarieZiedonis/publication/228767596 Patents as quality-signals-for entrepreneurialve
ntures/links/02e7e53519bca7ba8a000000.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GYR-8JPY] (finding that patents
increase the likelihood of securing financing in the semiconductor industry).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141.

Id.

142. Caroline Haeussler et. al, To Be Financed or Not . . . -the Role of Patents for Venture
Capital Financing (Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Discussion Paper No.
253, 2009), http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/253.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UQK-YQD7] (finding
that venture capitalists pay attention to patent quality).
143. Long, supra note 121.
144. Id. at 627.
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difficult or impossible to obtain through other means. 145 In her view,
intellectual property was more fully justified under this view than
under an exclusionary rights-only framework. 146 Thus, some patents
that had previously been considered worthless (or more accurately, not
worth the cost of procuring) had positive value when considered in the
14 7
context of patent signals.
This signaling function that patents perform is made possible
by the nontechnical disclosure of the patent itself. Disclosure is
mandated by the patent statute, and without that mandated
disclosure it would be impossible (without actions by the patent
owner) to identify what patents a company had produced. The
information gleaned by the venture capitalist or other interested party
need not be technical in nature; they may not be concerned (at least
initially) with the teaching of the patent. Instead, venture capitalists
may be concerned with other, nontechnical information that they can
only find in the patent document.
3. The Patent Owner
When a patent issues, the world knows who owns the rights to
the patented invention: it is listed on the patent document. 148 This is
another way in which a patent may disclose nontechnical information
that is designed to increase innovation. Prospect theory holds that the
primary benefit of having a patent system is the centralization of
control the patent gives the inventor in commercializing the
technology.149 If someone has an idea for improving or building upon a
technology, they can rely on a patent to direct them to the rights
holder. 150 At least in theory.
Initially, a patent must list its owner's name and address.
Unfortunately the requirement to list the patent owner on a patent
does not carry over to subsequent owners. 5 ' So, while the PTO
maintains an ownership registry for all patents, listing an assignment
of a patent is entirely voluntary. 152 There are advantages in using the

145. Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
of such).
152.

Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 628.
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.").
See Kitch, supra note 17, at 285.
Id. at 283-84.
35 U.S.C. § 261 (noting that patents may be assigned, but not requiring any recording
Id.
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registry (prima facie evidence of ownership), 153 and there have been
calls for the PTO to strengthen the tracking of patent ownership
data. 154 As of the writing of this Article, the ownership registry was
the best public source for information about patent ownership.
However, it is far from a perfect solution.
This is an area where nontechnical disclosure should be
improved. Requiring owners to register any changes in ownership of a
patent with the PTO would go a long way toward maximizing the
disclosure function of patent law. 155 If we take disclosure obligations
seriously, we should care that patent ownership is difficult to track
down.156
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF NONTECHNICAL DISCLOSURE
FOR PATENT THEORY

The fact that patents disclose useful information is not a novel
idea; in fact an entire theory of the patent system is premised on the
disclosure of information to the public. 157 Without the disclosure of the
technical information about how a patent operates, there would be no
quid in the patent quid pro quo. 158 Although there are other theories of
the patent system that could explain why patents are granted that do
not involve disclosure,1 5 9 in general those theories are not relied upon
by courts.
But what about nontechnical disclosure? What is gained from
recognizing that some information in the patent is not targeted to the
PHOSITA and does not tell us anything about how the invention
operates?

153. Id.:
An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, without
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months
from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.
154. Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 257, 258 (2008).

155. Id.
156. Id. at 259.
157. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a
limited period of time.").
158. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
159. The incentive to invent theory holds disclosure as only leading to further innovation
when the patent is for a non-self-disclosing invention and there is no other means of protection
that could substitute for patenting. See Strandburg, supra note 64, at 105.
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There are two main theoretical takeaways from an
understanding of nontechnical disclosure. First, nontechnical
disclosure more thoroughly elucidates the reasons people or companies
may seek patent protection. Second, nontechnical disclosure may
impact prospect theory, or more precisely, how prospect theory
operates in practice. Nontechnical disclosure can alter our
understanding of the means of commercializing and advertising a
patent. The remainder of this Article explores these issues.
A. The Desire to Patent
Many scholars have written about why people choose to patent
160
inventions that seem to be worth less than the cost to obtain them.
Nontechnical disclosure provides another explanation for this
phenomenon. Given the choice to patent an invention or keep it as a
trade secret, many inventors choose trade secrecy. 161 Trade secrecy, in
comparison to patenting, has advantages: potentially unlimited
duration, reduced costs of acquisition, and a broader array of
technologies than that are covered by the legal regime. 162 But there
are also other reasons to choose trade secrecy.1 63 For example, many
inventors find the patent disclosure requirement to be a real drawback
when compared to trade secrecy. 64 Also, it can be difficult to detect
infringement with certain technologies, so it may be in an investor's
best interest to maintain the invention in secret rather than tell the
165
whole world about it, as is required by patent laws.
Yet scholars have paid scant attention to the fact that
disclosure of the nontechnical kind may be attractive to certain
inventors. 66 That attraction is not captured by the traditional
exclusive rights paradigm traditionally associated with academic
theories of patent rights. An inventor could be attracted to the
advertising ability that a patent gives him, to a patent's ability to
secure investment, or the prestige that comes from being a patented

160. See, e.g., Long, supra note 121; Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting,MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2740947 [https://perma.ccVA4D-2CQT].
161. See Wesley M. Cohen, et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. ManufacturingFirms Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
162. See Anderson, supra note 59, at 949.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 926.
165. Id.
166. But see Long, supranote 121.

1600

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:6:1573

inventor. 167 An inventor may be persuaded to patent his invention
although the exclusive rights gained through the patent have minimal
168
value.
The curious thing about nontechnical disclosure is that most
inventors are likely to desire this type of disclosure, whereas
traditional disclosure is, generally speaking, seen as something the
inventor is being forced to give up in exchange for the patent. The
fruits of nontechnical disclosure (prestige, ease of commercialization
coordination, marketing, etc.) are often attractive to inventors.
Nontechnical disclosure only serves to increase the value of the
patent, not detract from it as traditional disclosure may do.
People seek patent protection for various reasons. They may be
seeking patent protection in order to advertise the innovative nature
of their firm or the quality of their product. They might be seeking
patent protection for the prestige that obtaining a patent gives them
among their professional peers. 169 They might seek patent protection
in order to communicate to potential collaborators about their
technology. Nontechnical disclosure is not the only theory that
explains this low-value patenting phenomenon, but it is an additional
piece in the puzzle.
B. Prospect Theory Implications
The prospect theory holds that the patent system is best
understood as a means of putting a patent in the hands of the person
who is best able to exploit that technology. 170 Just as with real
property theory, prospect theory puts the emphasis on identifying who
controls a given property right (for example, land or technology), and
then allowing the market to control who contributes to or builds on
1 71
that technology.
Nontechnical disclosure provides the prospect theory with
another way of identifying the ownership of the rights and, perhaps
more importantly, the ability to convey information about ownership
broadly. Edmund Kitch, to whom the prospect theory is generally
credited, seems to acknowledge this fact. He thought that disclosure of
a patent that occurs in the patent document's specification (what I call
167. For more on the prestige value of patents, see Stephanie P. Bair, The Psychology of
Patent Protection,48 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2015).
168. Long, supra note 121.
169. Anderson, supra note 59.
170. See Kitch, supra note 17.
171. Id. at 266.
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the technical disclosure) was an effort to set the legal bounds of the
rights: "The purpose of the description in the patent is not to disclose
the commercially relevant technology, but to provide a context in
which the legal limits of the claim acquire meaning."'172 For true
disclosure about the advantages and usefulness of an invention, the
patentee would rely on other means, according to Kitch: "He will do
this [disseminate information about the invention], not through the
balky mechanisms of a formal patent application." 173 Although Kitch
seems to suggest that the inventor will personally disclose the
information, nontechnical disclosure from the patent itself can also
perform this function.
Indeed, nontechnical disclosure may be the primary means of
conveying information in the prospect theory. For the prospect theory
to work, one must have the boundaries of the right set out for all of the
world to see. 174 Most agree that this is accomplished via the patent
document: the scope of patent rights is defined by the claims and the
specification. But there is also a secondary purpose to the patent
document-it may attract collaborators who are interested in
modifying the invention.
CONCLUSION
Patent disclosure is more than the technical knowledge of how
to make and practice an invention. Disclosure has a technical as well
as an underappreciated nontechnical side. The nontechnical aspects
that a patent discloses include the owner of the patent, the nature of
the firm or the inventor, and the very fact that there is a patent in the
first place. Recognizing the existence of nontechnical disclosure paints
a more complete picture of patent disclosure and the theories behind
it.
Nontechnical disclosure can help explain the enduring mystery
of why people obtain patents that are worth less than the required
fees to obtain the patent. By looking beyond the exclusive rights
paradigm, we can see that a patent provides other, harder to quantify
benefits that might appeal to certain patentees. Among these are

172. Id. at 287.
173. Id.
174. Of course, this is assuming that the process of interpreting claims--claim
construction-is reasonably reliable, a highly dubious contention given courts' difficulty with
claim construction. See J. Jonas Anderson, Specialized Standardsof Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 151, 176-85 (2015) (demonstrating the appellate difficulty in reviewing claim construction
decisions).
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prestige, marketing, and ease of coordinating the future
commercialization of the invention.
Patent theory can also benefit by recognizing nontechnical
disclosure. The prospect theory diminishes the patent document's
ability to teach, a viewpoint shared by a number of academics. But
recognizing the nontechnical and nonteaching functions of patent
documents provides a way to better understand how information gets
disseminated. Nontechnical disclosure of the patent can bring together
inventors and commercializers in ways predicted by the theory, yet
heretofore left unexplained in practice.

